THE GOAL
This paper examines how developing nations
in Africa and Central Asia can achieve sustainable economic development and
growth.
THE CHALLENGE
A survey of a
map of sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia reveals a landscape of nations littered
with unstable and despotic regimes, dysfunctional economies, and deeply
impoverished populations. Add outbreaks
of civil and ethnic warfare, disease and famine, and terrorism to the landscape
and it becomes especially bleak. These
maladies have long persisted throughout these regions, despite massive efforts to
remedy them by western nations and multinational institutions. These entities have made numerous large scale
attempts to spur economic development over the last half century, but have
achieved little success in promoting sustained growth and prosperity in these
regions. The challenge is turning the
tide in the longstanding campaign to combat these persistent problems and place
developing nations in these regions on an upward trajectory of sustainable
economic growth. The spectacular failure
of western national and institutional aid programs in achieving this goal begs
for an alternative approach to sustainable economic development.
THE SOLUTION
In response,
economic development strategy for these targeted regions requires fundamental
shift in approach to focus on (1) investing in and developing “creative” or
“knowledge” industries; (2) utilizing intellectual property rights (IPR)
enforcement to finance and enable development; and (3) employing a micro-level,
grassroots model of developing creative industries and promoting IPR
enforcement.
THE PROBLEM
The problem
is that western nations and institutions have consistently failed, time and
again, to achieve any marked success in even denting the economic
dysfunctionality of developing nations in these regions. This lack of success is largely attributable
to flaws in policymakers’ traditional approach to economic development in these
regions. These attempts most often fail
because they: (1) provide funding to the
wrong types of investments and industries, (2) are inefficiently administered
at a macro-level, through layers of government, institutions, and
organizations, (3) offer limited accountability to investors and little
sustainability in generating long term growth and spillover benefits, and (4)
do not promote intellectual property right enforcement to protect investments.
THE FOCUS
There are a
number of global economic trends and debates that make examining economic
development strategy and creative industry investment in Africa and Central
Asia particularly relevant right now.
The Flat World
Thomas
Friedman’s 2005 “pop-econ” book The World
Is Flat chronicled the journalists’ take on the globalization of world
economies, the title a reflection of his belief that the competitive playing
field among nations had been “leveled.”
Citing the example of India’s rapid and unexpected transformation into a
global information technology power, he reasoned that traditional economic
powerhouses like the U.S. lost their competitive advantages because of the occurrence
of “flattening” events and convergence of technological and geopolitical
trends.[1] One of the critical takeaways from Friedman’s
work is that despite bleak socioeconomic and political conditions in many
developing nations, talented people are everywhere and the flat world makes
access to markets and success within reach.
Information technology, telecommunications access, workflow
collaboration, outsourcing and offshoring practices, access to information, and
the ubiquity of personal communication technologies (computers, mobile phones,
instant messaging, VoIP) have all made entry and access to markets far more
affordable and universal, empowering individuals across the globe to compete.[2] It can be argued therefore, that the Flat
World finally allows individuals, investors, and markets to tap and activate
pools of “dead capital,” by giving those sources of such capital an outlet to
market their talents and knowledge.[3]
The Great Recession, The Limits of Growth,
& Emerging Markets
When the
global economy came to the brink of collapse in the fall of 2008, it offered a
unique opportunity to look both forward and backward at global economic trends –
a sort of moment of reflection in the eye of the storm. Many analysts have questioned whether many of
the conventional assumptions about markets and economic growth will still hold
true coming out of the recession. Key to
this analysis is the role of “emerging” industries like alternative energy,
green transportation, and information technology to fuel growth in the coming
decades. Pitted against these disruptive
trends are the traditional heavyweights of global economic growth: the
production of fossil fuels, raw industrial materials, and agricultural
commodities.[4] These prime movers for growth each face the
challenge of depleted resources. Decades
of intensive growth are rapidly exhausting non-renewable resources like fossil
fuels and raw materials, while increasing world populations have depleted
arable land.[5] As a result, investors will need to look to
new sources of economic growth as these industries stagnate, while innovators
must figure out how to replace these critical nonrenewable inputs, and
governments will scramble to find new revenue sources. This sort of global “crossroads” presents
opportunities for emerging nations to capitalize on fundamental market changes.
New Imperialism
“Old”
imperialism defined by the race for raw materials and cheap labor by European
nations, who colonized nations and peoples across the globe. “New” imperialism is about the same thing –
sans formal colonization – as emerging industrial powers like China and petrocracies
are making a second worldwide gambit for raw materials. China has invested billions of dollars in
African nations to secure access to fossil fuels and raw materials for
industrial production to fuel future growth.[6] Meanwhile petrocracies like Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia, awash in oil revenues, have leased massive tracts of African land to
establish gigantic farms to produce food for their burgeoning populations.[7] The critical question that arises from this
issue is what its implication hold for developing nations. Will developing nations be locked back into
commodity booms and busts by pinning economic hopes on these agreements? Or will these massive investments in
infrastructure improvements and resulting revenues complement and enable growth
in other economic sectors – notably creative and knowledge industries?
The Aid Debate
The argument over whether aid
programs administered by the World Bank, IMF, UN, U.S., and other institutions
have truly been effective is not new – but it is beginning to reach a
crescendo. Dead
Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa, published
by author Dambisa Moyo early in 2009 has reignited the debate. Moyo argues that it is time to essentially
“cut off” Africa from traditional aid programs because they have created a
culture of dependency, led to corruption, and been almost entirely ineffective
in achieving their goals. The debate
over the Kerry-Lugar Bill (discussed further below) raises similar issues about
aid tied to U.S. military alliances and the true intentions and motives of such
aid programs and the conditions placed on them.
ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGE: THE FAILURE OF POSTWAR INSTITUTIONS
“Running the Playbook:” What Hasn’t
Worked & What Won’t Work
In the movie Die Hard, a group of terrorists take over
a high rise office building in downtown Los Angeles and threaten to blow up the
building and the hostages inside of it unless their ransom demands are met by
law enforcement authorities.[8] To counter the terrorists, the FBI sends in a
crack team of expert agents, who methodically execute a slate of
counter-terrorist measures. One
character quips that the agents “have got
the universal terrorist playbook and they're running it, step by step.” Shortly thereafter the expert agents are
killed while assaulting the building, the terrorists loot the building’s vault,
and the terrorist leader reveals that his strategy was predicated on his bet
that the FBI would operate exactly according to their “playbook.” So has gone economic development strategy in
Africa and Central Asia for the last half century.
The Postwar Playbook: Marshall Plans
& Bretton Woods
Post-World
War II economic development strategy initiatives around the world are often
modeled on, or draw on the structure and strategy of the Marshall Plan – the
iconic economic recovery master plan for western Europe in the wake of World
War II. The Marshall Plan was grandiose
in scale and scope, from the volume of funds it distributed, to the multiple layers
of bureaucracy through which the funds flowed, to the vast number of programs
and projects that it subsidized. The
Bretton Woods Agreements of 1944 established the World Bank (WB) and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) – critical institutions for administering aid
funding and redevelopment projects in war-torn western Europe. Together these institutions provided the
bureaucratic infrastructure for the massive infusions of capital into postwar
economies.
Both measures
were largely successes, they ignited regional economic growth in western Europe
and bore a number of multinational institutions that promoted further growth
and geopolitical stability. However, they
also became the model (and the means, in the case of the IMF and WB) for many
of the large scale projects and programs that followed and flowed from those
postwar institutions. In theory, the
success of both seemed to provide a roadmap for economic development for other
regions, but their promise has gone almost entirely unrealized. While the Marshall Plan and Bretton Woods
Plans worked well in addressing the situation they were designed for; their
grand scale model of large aid packages has not always been as successful in
subsequent applications and variations. The
Marshall playbook has not been successfully adapted to African and Central
Asian development programs because the conditions and context are not the same.[9]
The failure
of these adaptations has been spectacular.
Western-led multinational institutions have expended more than one
trillion dollars through aid and development programs in the last fifty years.[10] These programs have become so countless and
seemingly perpetual in nature that many developing nations seem to have become
conditioned to expect they will be appropriated largesse from these programs.[11] Multinational aid programs fund countless
initiatives and aid agendas in every corner of the globe, rarely making a
distinction between good and bad investments or even considering or evaluating
the funds as investments at all.[12]
Chips on the Table: Cold War, Post-9/!! Plans, & The Trust
Deficit
Cold War-era
aid programs also have been roundly criticized for their cross purposes. While officially disbursed to fund
development and aid programs, Cold War-era programs also functioned to
influence geopolitics in the race to prevent a “domino” collapse of pro-western
governments to communist regimes.[13] Through aid programs, the U.S. and its allies
could fund friendly regimes or revolutionary insurgencies, whichever allowed
them to maintain or expand their sphere of influence to stymie the Soviet
Union. This utilization of aid arguably
left the recipients of such funds as little more than “chips on the table” or
“puppets on strings,” to be manipulated at the discretion of the U.S.
The Post-9/!!
world is not much different. In its “War
on Terror,” the United States has actively engaged in warfare and “nation
building” with the objective of combating terrorist organizations and creating
geopolitical stability, especially in Central Asia. Skepticism about cross-purposed aid continues
to abound, as evidenced by controversy over an international aid program
proposed by Senators John Kerry and Richard Lugar. A Marshall-like plan, the “Kerry-Lugar Bill”
will commit $1.5 billion to Pakistan annually for five years, for spending on
non-military development and aid programs in the country. Attached to the funds however, are a web of
conditions and restrictions on how the funds can be utilized and invested. Contrary to American expectations, the $7.5
billion aid program has been met with withering criticism in Pakistan for its
heavy-handedness and outsized expectations of civil progress and reform. Pakistanis have argued there is such a
significant “trust deficit” with regards to the U.S. motivations and interests
in granting such funding that while the program may be beneficial, it is so
suspect that it ought to be rejected or significantly redrafted.[14] The opposition to the bill by Pakistanis is
indicative of why these grand-scale plans are not suited to promoting economic
development: recipient nations simply do not trust that the U.S. is genuine in
its commitment to funding these programs.
Overall,
large scale aid programs have roundly failed because they do a number of things
poorly. They make investments and
funding to the wrong types of projects and industries. They are inefficiently administered through
the multiple levels of bureaucracy that they must pass through. More troubling however, is that despite the
layers of administration that the funds pass through, there is often no
accountability for the funds ultimate expenditure. Or, in the case of a Kerry-Lugar-esque
program, there are so many conditions on the funds that recipients back away
out of fear of over-accountability.
Where there is no accountability and funds are not spent as envisioned,
investors have no recourse because they do not have any fungible force to deal
with the problem. Take a noncompliant
African nation for example. If a
despotic ruler misspends funds, an institution can do little. It cannot use military force to recoup the
funds. It cannot increase loan interest
or assess penalties, because those measures would be counter to the economic
development goal. And it cannot withhold
future aid because it would counter the development goal and potentially place
the nation in an even worse position.
Thus, it is high time to scrap the old playbook and pursue new
approaches to economic development in developing nations.
A NEW GAMEPLAN: INVESTMENTS IN CREATIVE INDUSTRIES
Who Are Creatives?
In 2002,
Richard Florida published The Rise of the
Creative Class, which traced postindustrial economic development in U.S.
cities to the growth of a socioeconomic class of people he dubbed the “creative
class.” Florida’s Creative Class is divided
into two segments, “core creatives” and “creative professionals.”[15] He defines the core creatives as having
primary job functions that task them with being creative and innovative. Core creatives work in science, engineering, computer
programming, information technology, academic research, education, arts,
design, and media.[16] These workers generally use their creative
and innovative skills to create consumer products and goods.[17] The other segment of the Creative Class, the
creative professionals, use knowledge accumulated by earning higher degrees of
education in their jobs. Creative
professionals work in healthcare, business, finance, education, and legal
practice.[18] They generally use the knowledge they possess
to develop creative problem solving approaches.[19]
Florida
argues that the Creative Class has been a key driver for economic development
in postindustrial cities in the United States and throughout the world.[20] He argues that the attraction and aggregation
of Creative Class workers in cities spurs economic growth in technology,
research and development, and arts and media fields in those cities. California’s Silicon Valley, Boston’s Route
128, North Carolina’s Triangle, Austin. Texas, Nashville, Tennessee, and
Seattle, Washington are all frequently cited examples of Creative Class cities.[21] Florida argues that the Creative Class will
continue to grow in size and fuel economic growth in the cities in which they
cluster, while those cities that fail to retain or attract creatives will
atrophy and wither economically.[22] The presence of creative clusters is seen as
key to driving knowledge and technology based economic growth.
Why Fund Creatives?
In the early
1980’s, MIT physicist-economist David Birch produced research in which he
argued that small businesses in the U.S. were responsible for the creation of
most new jobs in the economy. His theory
categorized businesses and rate of job creation/economic growth in terms of
animalia: big firms were elephants (large and lumbering); small firms were mice
(small and easy perishable); and medium firms were gazelles (fast and
volatile).[23] Birch found that the gazelles were
responsible for most of the growth and argued that economic resources,
investment, and policy should be steered to these fast movers to promote
growth.[24] He found that the growth was not confined to
any particular industry or sector; but rather that gazelles could exist and
thrive in almost any industry.[25] The mice have been nearly as successful at
creating jobs and growth, but because they are so numerous, they do not produce
as many jobs on a relative, per firm, basis.[26] However, Birch argues that the global shift
to knowledge industries underscores the importance of mice and gazelles, as
these firms can generate the most growth and adapt to change and economic
conditions.
Taken
together, Florida and Birch’s theories offer a model for economic growth in
Africa and Central Asia. The impact of
creatives on postindustrial economies in western nations, particularly the U.S.
and Europe demonstrates the transformative economic force that creative and
knowledge industries have become. Considering
that creatives and innovators are everywhere, the potential for the creation of
a Creative Class in these developing regions exists. Birch’s theory is important because it
illustrates that small firms are primary growth generators – extremely
important to emerging economies that have to overcome a “staggered start” to
catch-up to developed nations. The potential
then, is that western nations and multinational institutions can provide
funding to creatives, who then cluster to collaborate and innovate, spurring
growth and additional investment, creating new jobs and spillovers to promote
more growth, and building a network of new firms anchored in the nodes of
creative clusters. But the investment in
creative industries requires protection to ensure that the returns to investors
and creatives are secure and sustainable.
Enforcement of intellectual property rights provides the means to
accomplish this necessary condition for development and long term growth.
ENFORCING THE RULES OF THE GAME: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
Creative Industries Need IPR Enforcement
The need for
intellectual property enforcement to protect creative industries is key because
of the nature of creative products.
“Core” creative industry products are intellectual property: academic
research, arts, design, and media products need copyrights; information
technology, scientific research, and application programming need patents;
while consumer products and materials need trademarks. Creating and ensuring these rights are one of
the critical functions of the creative professionals, who use the knowledge
gained through higher education to devise and utilize IPR protection schemes,
financing, and distribution of these products.
IPR enforcement is vital to combat piracy and other infringement to
protect the labor and capital investment that creatives’ commit to producing
their products. Without IPR protection,
there is no incentive for engaging in the production of creative goods if their
value can be robbed by pirates and misappropriators. Mark Schultz and Alex Van Gelder’s paper, “Nashville
In Africa” chronicles this precise problem in the commercial African music
industry. Most commercial African music
is produced in London and Paris – not Africa – because a lack of IPR
enforcement leads to piracy, record label renegement on contracts, and lacking
royalty payments.[27]
IPR Is Best Suited To Promoting Creative
Industry Investment
It is evident
that without IPR enforcement creative workers have no incentive to invest in
the creation of products from which they cannot profit. It also then follows that investors in
creative enterprises will be dissuaded from funding creative industries if they
cannot expect a return on their investment because the product’s profitability
is compromised by a lack of IPR enforcement.
Therefore, IPR is what is necessary to promote investment in creative
industries; investors need predictability and a degree of certainty to commit
substantial capital to enterprises and creative producers need to know that
they will have access to judicial remedies to enforce protection of the IPR in
their products.[28] Embracing IPR promotes the rule of law,
allows developing nations to better integrate their economies with those of
developed nations (who have stronger IPR protections), and then create
spillover benefits that accrue to other industries and entities. Because creative products need IPR to be
profitable, IPR is the best mechanism to promote development of these
industries in developing nations.
Barriers to IPR
The problem
with IPR enforcement is that intellectual property is “largely a fantasy in
most developing nations.”[29] This fantasy comes in a variety of flavors,
paced by weak and ineffective judicial systems.[30] A lack of an effective judiciary in both
understanding IP law and failing to enforce it leads to systemic problems. IPRs are then marginalized by governments and
political action groups, who focus on other issues. Marginalization leads to weak regulations and
a lack of state intervention to address IPR issues. Poor IPR enforcement systems also lead to mechanical
delays in adjudicating IPR disputes – if they are addressed at all. Corrupt governments also prevent the
enforcement of the general rule of law, so that IPRs are subsumed into this
general culture and state of lawlessness.
On an international level, multinational attempts to promote IPR have
failed as well. The WTO’s Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights Agreement (TRIPs) has not been effective in developing IPR
rights, as nations have expended more energy in
clashes over the substance and scope of the agreement, than its
application and enforcement of IPR.[31] There is also an expectation that IPR
protections can be developed overnight – that the relative successes of nations
like India in transforming their economies and increasing IPR can be easily
replicated elsewhere. There are
significant benchmarks however that must be met prior to the development of
strong IPR enforcement regimes, leaving developing nations to deal with a
multifaceted slate of issues surrounding IPR.[32]
So,
developing nations are faced with the classic “chicken and egg” problem; if it
is a prerequisite for development that creative industries need intellectual
property rights to be strongly enforced, and IPR enforcement is lacking, then
which needs to come first, enforcement of a strong IPR regime or development of
a creative industry to avail itself of the IPR’s?
This much is
apparent – large scale development programs and policy regimes have not been
effective at creating “top down” change – neither in spurring sustained
economic growth or leading to stronger IPR protections. Pouring billions in aid through bureaucracies
and government institutions and developing international IPR agreements have
not trickled down to the creators and innovators that drive growth. The solution then is to reverse the playing
field and rewrite the rule book, so that investment flows in a micro level,
then “trickles up.” The chicken and egg
problem can solved by investing directly in creatives, who then use their
influence to drive grassroots change and secure IPR enforcement. This approach views creatives as the ultimate
agents of change; leading an “insurgency” that can transform developing nations
economically through knowledge industry development, made possible by IPR
enforcement.
REWRITING THE RULE BOOK: CREATIVE INSURGENCY & THE IPR REVOLUTION
The Trickle Down Folly
As noted
repeatedly in this paper, funding for economic development through
multinational institutions and government bureaucracies has been almost totally
ineffective in achieving its desired outcomes.
The problem is not entirely attributable to the source of the funds and
the agenda of those sources, but largely due to the ineffective model of
trickle down disbursement of those funds by recipient nations. Once the funds are received by nations under
the current regimes (IMF, WB, etc…) the government of that nation is then
charged with disbursing them. What can
ensue: corruption and graft, funding of pet projects and political allies, or
misappropriation of funds to other government units or projects (funding
military projects with humanitarian aid for example). Trying to get funding down to creative
industries through these layers of administration is a folly at best – the presence of
entrenched growth coalitions and bureaucratic fiefdoms means that aid packages
that flow like waterfalls to developing nations end up as a trickle by the time
they reach creatives – if they ever do.
Boiling Up
The solution
then is to reverse the flow. Instead of
funding economic development from the top down, as programs have invariably
done for the last fifty years to no effect, it is time to start providing
funding directly to those entities that it is intended for: the actual workers
and enterprises in the private economy. Direct
funding of creatives is key because it could accomplish multiple objectives at
once. First, as Sherwood argues,
development and enforcement of an effective IPR regime must come from inside
developing nations, but without constituents for IPR there can be no political
will to effectuate change. Thus, funding
creatives creates this constituent class to advocate IPR. By providing them with funding, they then
have the resources to advocate and achieve IPR reform as well. Concurrently, as creatives use these
resources to strengthen IPR, they also can use the funds to grow their
enterprises, which fuels overall growth.
If the impact of creatives in the postwar American economy and the role
of small businesses in spurring economic growth in the U.S. hold true in
developing nations, then creative industries can provide the sustainable
economic growth these regions so sorely lack.
In essence by funding creatives directly, it is like heating a teakettle
of water – focusing the resources at the bottom of the economy will lead to a head
of steam at the top.
TIPPING THE SCALES: CONCLUSIONS
In summary,
by fueling this creative insurgency, developing nations can finally see
sustainable economic growth and the fruits of such development. The portion of this paper’s title that
alludes to “regime change” is the ultimate goal of this IPR revolution; to
create stability and prosperity in regions that have experienced such
conditions. In embracing this
alternative model for creating growth, these objectives would be accomplished:
(1) the postwar aid playbook will be scrapped, (2) the aid to government agenda
will be broken, (3) the trust deficit between the west (particularly the U.S.)
and developing nations will be balanced, (4) creative industries will provide
an alternative/complementary growth model to compete/balance new imperialist
investments, and (5) stronger economies and IPR protections will better
integrate world economies creating reciprocal dividends and opportunities for
both developed and developing nations.
Regime Change: Sustainable Economic Development, The
Creative Insurgency, & The IPR Revolution In Africa & Central Asia
[1] Thomas Friedman, The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century, FSG (2005).
[2] Friedman, Id.
[3]
See Hernando De Soto, The Mystery
of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else,
Basic Books (2003) and Enrique Ghersi, The Informal Economy in
Latin America, Cato Journal 17:1 (1997) for estimates of how much dead
capital is “locked up” in developing nations.
Dead capital theorists generally argue that formalization and
enforcement of property rights are key to unlocking these assets.
[4] Bill McKibben, Deep Economy: The Wealth of Communities and the Durable Future,
Times Books (2007).
[5] McKibben, Id.
[6] See Bill Powell, It’s China’s World (We Just Live In It), Fortune (October 26, 2009);
Alyssa Abowitz, China Buys The World, Fortune
(October 26, 2009).
[7] Powell, Abowitz, Id.
[8] Die Hard became something of a “playbook” itself. After its blockbuster success, Hollywood studios were apparently inundated with producers and junior executives pitching Die Hard variants. See Under Siege: “It’s Die Hard on a boat!”; Die Hard II: “It’s Die Hard on a plane!”; and Speed: “It’s Die Hard on a bus!”
[9] Moyo argues that the Marshall “model” does not translate because
postwar capital investments in Europe were well defined, more limited in scope,
and were well implemented and utilized by institutions – all conditions that
lack in Africa. Aida Edemariam, Everybody Knows It Doesn't Work, The Guardian Online, www.guardian.co.uk/society/2009/feb/19/dambisa-moyo-dead-aid-africa
[10] Moyo, Dead Aid.
[11] Edemariam, Everybody Knows.
[12] Studies of foreign aid
programs have found that corrupt governments receive as much, if not more aid
than less corrupt governments and that foreign aid does not reduce
corruption. See Alberto Alesina &
Beatrice Weder, Do Corrupt Governments
Receive Less Foreign Aid? National
Bureau of Economic Research (1999).
[13] Edemariam, Everybody Knows.
[14] Faisal Kapadia, Pakistan: The Kerry-Lugar Bill, Global Voices Online, http://globalvoicesonline.org/2009/10/14/pakistan-the-kerry-lugar-bill
[15] Richard Florida, The Rise of the Creative Class: And How It's Transforming Work, Leisure, Community and Everyday Life, Basic Books (2003).
[16] Florida, Id.
[17] Florida, Id.
[18] Florida, Id.
[19] Florida, Id.
[20] Richard Florida, The Flight of the Creative Class: The New
Global Competition for Talent, Harper Books
(2007).
[21] Richard Florida, Who's Your City?: How the Creative Economy
Is Making Where to Live the Most Important Decision of Your Life, Basic
Books (2009).
[22] Florida, Flight of the Creative Class.
[23] David Birch, The Job Generation Process, MIT Press (1979).
[24] Birch, Id.
[25] Birch, Id.
[26] Birch, Id.
[27]
Mark Schultz and Alec van Gelder, Nashville In Africa: Culture, Institutions, Entrepreneurship
and Development, IPN
(2008).
[28] Mark
Schultz and David Walker. How
Intellectual Property Became Controversial: NGOs And The New International IP
Agenda, 6 ENGAGE 82 (2005).
[29] Robert Sherwood, Global Prospects For The Role Of
Intellectual Property In Technology Transfer, 42 IDEA 27 (2002).
[30] Sherwood, Id.
[31] Sherwood, Id.
[32]
Keith E. Maskus and J. H.
Reichman, The Globalization Of Private
Knowledge Goods And The Privatization Of Global Public Goods, Journal of International Economic Law (2004).
I would recommend looking into the case of Mongolia for an example of how supporting the creative class and private sector works. In 1999, the UN published a book about how Mongolia's pop musicians were leading the way in modernising the economy.
http://openlibrary.org/b/OL169170M/Mongolyn_rok_pop_o%CC%87o%CC%87rii%CC%86n_duu_khooloi%CC%86goor
The story is here: http://www.scribd.com/doc/20854733/Blue-Sky-Bulletin-Issue-Number-10
Posted by: Dave | 11/06/2009 at 06:07 AM